ABSTRACT. We consider a policy environment in which an entire industry is faced with possible imposition of an emissions tax if environmental goals are not met voluntarily. We develop a multiplefirm model of pollution abatement in this context. Using the concept of a self-enforcing equilibrium, we examine the free-riding incentive of individual firms and its impact on the viability of the voluntary approach. We find that, despite the free-riding problem, a sub-group of firms have an incentive to participate in the VA. The VA is strictly preferred by the industry as a whole, although it is not costminimizing. (JEL Q53, Q58)
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970s, policymakers have relied heavily on regulation as a means of controlling the emissions of environmental pollutants. These regulations have been widely criticized for being costly and inefficient. In response, policymakers have begun to search for alternative policies that allow environmental protection goals to be met at lower cost. One alternative is to move toward the use of incentive or marketbased policy instruments, such as emission taxes or marketable permits. Another alternative that has attracted policymakers' attention is increased reliance on voluntary environmental protection.
1 Since the early 1990s, hundreds of voluntary agreements (VAs) have been signed throughout the world, many of them in the European Community (see Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 1996; European Environmental Agency (EEA) 1997; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1999).
While many voluntary agreements are between regulators and individual firms, 2 often an agreement takes the form of an explicit or implicit agreement between regulators and a group of firms or an industry. Examples include the French agreement on the treatment of End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) (Lévêque and Nadaï 1995; EEA 1997; Aggeri and Hatchuel 1999) , the Norwegian waste agreements , and the German industry and trade associations' voluntary declaration on CO 2 reduction (Lévêque and Nadaï 1995; EEA 1997; Jochem and Eichhammer 1999) .
To be successful, a voluntary approach must have a sufficiently strong incentive for firm participation, that is, firms must in some way benefit from undertaking voluntary measures. Firms can benefit from adopting voluntary measures if a proactive environmental strategy allows them to exploit a market for environmentally friendly products or generate firm-specific public goodwill (Smart 1992; Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995; Esty 1997; Khanna and Damon 1999) . Alternatively, firms might voluntarily undertake pollution abatement if, by adopting voluntary measures, they can avoid more costly government policies that might be imposed. If the threatened government policy is a regulation with limited flexibility, firms can benefit from the increased flexibility that might accompany a voluntary approach.
3 If the threatened policy is an emissions tax, firms can benefit by avoiding the tax payments. For example, the voluntary agreements involving the German energy sector were prompted by threats of imposition of a carbon tax (EEA 1997; Jochem and Eichhammer 1999) . Similarly, voluntary agreements in Norway resulted from threats regarding imposition of a tax on packaging materials .
While threats of the imposition of regulation or emissions taxes can be effective in providing participation incentives, when applied to an entire industry they suffer from a potentially serious drawback, namely, the incentive for individual firms to freeride. If the industry can avoid the regulation or tax with less than full participation, then firms that do not participate can enjoy the benefits of avoiding the costly policy without the associated costs. Although some have argued that industry associations will find means to solve the free-rider problem (e.g., , a survey of voluntary approaches by the European Environmental Agency suggests that this may not always be true. It notes that ''Direct involvement through a trade association generally tends to display a high degree of free riding by SMEs (small and medium enterprises). Although this might not significantly affect the environmental performance of the agreement, it is of concern to its stability-i.e., the actions of SMEs in free riding might jeopardise the whole agreement'' (EEA 1997, p. 47) . Thus, an important policy question is whether this free-rider incentive, in fact, undermines the viability of a voluntary approach.
To date, the economic literature on voluntary approaches has focused primarily on single-firm models that do not allow for free-riding (e.g., Stranlund 1995; Babcock 1995, 1996; Cavaliere 1998; Miceli 1998, 1999) . 4 Two papers that examine the free-riding problem are Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) and Millock and Salanié (2000) . However, in both of these papers the free-rider problem takes the form of ''shirking'' by all firms, that is, all firms under-invest in pollution abatement. Neither paper considers equilibria in which a sub-group of firms take voluntary actions, while the remaining firms free-ride. Brau, Carraro, and Golfetto (2000) develop a model in which a subgroup of firms can participate. However, in their model the assumed benefits from participation imply that unless some firms are excluded from participation, under a successful VA no free-riding will occur (i.e., all firms will participate). Thus, their model does not explain the existence of openmembership VAs with less than full participation. The model developed in this paper differs from these previous studies in that it provides an explanation for the existence of free-riding by a subset of firms in equilibrium.
In this paper, we develop a multiple-firm model of voluntary adoption of environmental protection measures in which an entire industry is faced with industry-wide imposition of a costly government policy, namely, an emissions tax. The policy scenario is as follows. A regulator seeks to achieve an exogenous reduction in industrywide emissions. He sets a target emissions cap for the industry as a whole. He then provides the industry with an opportunity to meet the target voluntarily, with the explicit recognition that if the voluntary approach fails to meet the target, an emissions tax will be imposed on the industry, with the magnitude of the tax set at a level sufficient to ensure that the target 3 For discussions of the use of regulatory threats to induce voluntary participation, see Goodin (1986) , Lévêque and Nadaï (1995) , Miceli (1998, 1999) , and Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett. (2000) . will be met under the tax.
5 Because all firms benefit if the target is met but only those firms that reduce their emissions bear costs, firms face a free-rider incentive, that is, an incentive not to participate and reduce emissions voluntarily. We ask whether it is possible to have a successful voluntary approach despite this free-rider incentive.
Because participation in the voluntary program is voluntary and VAs are not legally binding (Stewart 1993; Gaines and Mfodwo 1996) , in modeling the voluntary approach we assume that it must be in the interest of all firms to adhere to their participation decisions despite the lack of any legal obligation to do so. To formalize this notion, we adopt the concept of a selfenforcing equilibrium that has been applied to the study of stable cartels and international environmental agreements (IEAs) (d 'Aspremont et al. 1983; d'Aspremont and Gabszewicz 1986; Donsimoni, Economides, and Polemarchakis 1986; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994) . A key contribution of this paper is the application of this concept to the case of industry-wide voluntary agreements and the resulting implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of this approach. Industry-wide VAs differ from IEAs in at least one crucial aspect, namely, the ability to threaten implementation of a regulation or tax if the target is not met voluntarily. This threat plays a key role in our analysis.
Using the concept of a self-enforcing equilibrium, the model predicts that in equilibrium only a subset of firms will participate in an industry-based voluntary program, a result that is consistent with the observations noted above. Nonetheless, the VA is successful in meeting the target, despite the existence (in equilibrium) of free-riders. Thus, the free-rider incentive does not undermine the viability of using a voluntary approach in this context. However, the free-riding that results generates an efficiency loss. This loss does not take the usual form of under-provision of the public good. Rather, the voluntary approach yields an inefficient allocation of total pollution abatement across firms. 6 Thus, although firms benefit from a cost savings under the voluntary approach, total abatement costs are higher than under imposition of the tax.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple illustrative example of the participation problem and the implications of free-rider incentives. The remainder of the paper then formalizes the results from the example. In Section 3, we provide an overview of the basic model and the equilibrium under the tax policy. Section 4 defines and characterizes the equilibrium under the voluntary approach using the concept of a self-enforcing equilibrium. In Section 5, we identify the efficiency loss from use of the VA and compare the private returns under the two policies. Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions.
II. A SIMPLE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We begin with a simple illustrative example to motivate our analysis. Consider an industry with only two (identical) firms. Let profits of firm i be given by
, where e i is the emissions level of firm i. In the absence of any government policy, each firm chooses the profit-maximizing level of e i , which is 10, 5 The policy approach examined here is similar to the provision point mechanism under which a public good is provided if and only if voluntary contributions are sufficient to cover the cost of providing the good (see, e.g., Lipman and Bagnoli 1989; Bagnoli and McKee 1991; Marks and Croson 1999; Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe 1999) . We are indebted to Bill Schulze for noting this similarity. It is also similar to the equilibrium with a minimal contributing set (see, e.g., van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes 1983; Rapoport 1985) . We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this analogy. 6 Note that, in a context where individuals contribute to provision of a public good out of their income, freeriding on the part of some individuals would not generate an efficiency loss provided total contributions are sufficient to ensure that the good is provided (assuming provision is efficient). However, in our context, since the public good is actually produced rather than simply financed by individual firms, free-riding behavior causes an efficiency loss since it implies that the allocation of production across firms is not efficient. See further discussion below.
implying total emissions of 20 units. Suppose now that the regulator wants to reduce total emissions to 10 units. One possibility is to impose an emissions tax of $10/unit on each firm. This would induce each firm to reduce emissions to five units, yielding before-tax profits of $75 and after-tax profits of $25 per firm. Alternatively, the regulator could offer the firms a chance to meet the aggregate or collective target voluntarily, with an understanding that if the target is not met voluntarily, the emissions tax will be imposed. Suppose that participation implies a commitment to ensure that the target is met voluntarily. If both firms agree to participate in this voluntary approach, they agree to share the required reduction equally, with each reducing emissions to five units. However, if one agrees to participate and the other does not, then the non-participant will continue to emit 10 units, implying that the participant would have to reduce emissions to 0 units in order to ensure that the collective target is met. The resulting payoff matrix is depicted in Figure 1 .
The concept of a self-enforcing equilibrium requires that (1) each participating firm (i.e., each member of the coalition) earn a profit level that is at least as high as it would have earned if no firms participate (profitability); and (2) neither firm be able to benefit by unilaterally changing its participation decision (i.e., joining or leaving the coalition), given the need for participation to remain profitable (stability). 7 For the above example, full participation (P,P) is the only self-enforcing equilibrium. Clearly, (1) is met at this equilibrium. To see that (2) is met as well, note that if one firm (say, Firm 1) ''defects,'' the remaining coalition (of one) will dissolve because it is no longer profitable, making Firm 1 worse off than if it were to stay in the coalition (i.e., continue to participate). Recognizing this, Firm 1 will not defect and the full-participation equilibrium will be self-enforcing.
Note, however, that (P,P) is not a Nash equilibrium. In this example, it is easily shown that the only Nash equilibrium is (NP,NP). Although the two equilibrium concepts yield identical equilibria in some cases (see example below), they differ in an important respect, namely, that the selfenforcing equilibrium requires that the coalition be profitable while the concept of a Nash equilibrium does not have a comparable requirement for individuals. Interestingly, while a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in participation does not necessarily exist, we show below that in our model a self-enforcing equilibrium (in pure While the above example illustrates a case where full participation is self-enforcing, it is also possible for partial participation to be self-enforcing. Consider the case where the regulator wants to reduce total emissions to 16 units, either voluntarily or through imposition of a $4/unit emissions tax. The payoff matrix is given in Figure 2 . This payoff matrix yields two self-enforcing equilibria, (P,NP) and (NP,P), both of which imply partial participation. Note that in this example, full participation (P,P) is not a self-enforcing equilibrium. 8 If both firms initially joined the coalition, either firm would have an incentive to defect, knowing that the remaining firm would find it more profitable to meet the target on its own than to face the tax. Given this, (P,P) would not be stable.
Several characteristics of the partial participation equilibria should be noted. First, under either equilibria the collective target is met voluntarily. However, both involve ''free-riding'' in the sense that the target is met entirely through the abatement efforts of one firm. It is not possible to predict which equilibrium will emerge, that is, which firm will participate and which will not. Second, as expected, the profit level of the non-participant (the free-rider) is higher than the profit level of the participant. Thus, given a choice, a firm would clearly prefer to be in the equilibrium in which it is the non-participant, rather than the equilibrium in which it is the participant. Nonetheless, in the equilibrium in which it is the participant, participation is still the best response to the strategy of the other firm. Thus, given that the other firm chooses not to participate, the participant is still better off participating than not participating and effectively causing the coalition to dissolve. The reason, of course, is that the tax savings realized by avoiding the tax through participation exceeds the additional abatement cost incurred by reducing emissions from 8 to 6.
8 Both Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) and Millock and Salanié (2000) consider only full participation equilibria.
FIGURE 2 PAYOFF MATRIX WITH A TARGET OF 16 UNITS
9 It is interesting to note that introducing heterogeneity does not necessarily allow us to predict which firm will participate and which will not. As a simple example to illustrate this point, consider a case where the profit functions of the two firms are given by p 1 e 1 ð Þ~20e 1 { e 2 1 and p 2 e 2 ð Þ~24e 2 { e 2 2 and the regulator seeks to reduce emissions to 18 units. In this case, Firm 1 has a lower marginal cost of abatement than Firm 2. Yet, both (P,NP) and (NP,P) are self-enforcing equilibria. At one equilibrium, only the low cost firm participates while at the other equilibrium only the high cost firm participates.
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Finally, note that each firm's payoff is higher when the target is met voluntarily than when it is not, implying that both the participant and the non-participant strictly prefer to meet the target voluntarily. However, total before-tax profits are lower ($184 in equilibrium vs. $192 if the tax is imposed), implying that meeting the target voluntarily results in a welfare loss. The explanation is that, because of free-riding, the required emission reduction is not allocated efficiently across the two firms when the target is met voluntarily, while it is allocated efficiently when the tax is imposed. The outcome that involves no freeriding and maximizes both before-and after-tax aggregate profit, namely (P,P), is not a self-enforcing equilibrium.
In the above examples, the self-enforcing equilibria implied that the target would be met voluntarily. It is also possible to construct examples where (NP,NP) is also a self-enforcing equilibrium. For example, if the collective target was set at 12 units instead of 16, three self-enforcing equilibria exist: (P,NP), (NP,P), and (NP,NP). The observations above continue to hold, except that in this case the participant is indifferent between the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily and the equilibrium under which the tax is imposed.
The above examples provide some intuition for the results that we derive more generally below.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL
We consider a model with N identical firms. Each firm produces an output level y i and an emission level e i . The firm's production costs are given by a continuous function C(y i ,e i ), where C y . 0, C # 0, C yy $ 0, C ee $ 0, and C ye # 0 . The cost function is assumed to be the same under both the emission tax policy and the VA, that is, no cost advantage exists per se from reducing emissions voluntarily. This is in contrast to other models that assume that any given level of emissions reduction can be achieved at a lower cost under the VA than under the alternative policy (typically, a regulation), because the VA gives the firm greater flexibility in choosing its pollution control measures. 10 It is assumed that firms do not benefit directly from reductions in emissions.
11 Thus, absent any government policy, firms have no private incentive for pollution abatement.
12
As noted above, the regulator seeks to meet an exogenously determined aggregate emissions cap E, where 0 , E , Ne 0 and e 0 is the equilibrium level of emissions for each firm prior to any government policy. 13 If in the aggregate the firms meet the emissions cap voluntarily, the regulator will not impose a tax on the industry. However, if the firms fail to meet the cap collectively, the regulator will impose a uniform emission tax t on the entire industry, with the magnitude of the tax set at the level necessary to ensure that the emissions cap E is met.
14 Because the incentive to participate in the voluntary initiative depends on the payoffs 11 Because our interest is in the design of environmental policy, we focus on regulatory threats as a motivation for participation in a VA and ignore any reputational gains or any gains that might result from appealing to ''green consumers.'' As noted in the Introduction, these gains provide a potential motivation for ''green production'' that is independent of any government policy (see, e.g., Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995) .
12 This is in contrast to the literature on international environmental agreements (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994; Becker and Easter 1999) , which is generally concerned with global pollutants. In these models, all countries benefit directly from both their own abatement and the abatement of other countries. 13 Note that if E 5 0, i.e., if the government seeks to ban emissions entirely, then even under a tax policy that meets the target the firms will make no tax payment (since emissions are zero). In this case, firms do not benefit from meeting the target voluntarily rather than having the tax imposed.
14 We do not consider a case where the regulator would impose a tax only on those firms that did not participate in the voluntary programs. Some voluntary programs are of this type, i.e., they allow individual firms to avoid a (higher) tax by participation in a voluntary program (Chidiak 1999; Millock 1999 (e). In Stage 2, each firm chooses its emissions level to maximize after-tax profits p(e) 2 te, given the emissions levels of all other firms. This yields an optimal emissions level e Ã (t), which depends on the tax rate t.
17 In Stage 1, the regulator sets the tax rate to ensure that the target will be met. The resulting tax rate t Ã is implicitly defined by Ne Ã (t Ã ) 5 E. Note that t Ã is homogeneous of degree zero in (N,E). Thus, the emissions tax depends only on the stringency of the emissions cap (E/N). If faced with this tax, each firm will earn an after-tax profit level of p
IV. EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE VA
We turn next to the equilibrium under the voluntary approach. Again, we view the problem as a three-stage game. In Stage 1, each firm decides whether or not to join the group of firms that participate in the voluntary approach, where participation entails a commitment to share equally with all other participants the emission reductions that are necessary to ensure that the collective target is met. Note that, instead of treating the participation decision separately, we could have simply modeled the firms' emission choices as a Nash equilibrium. This is the approach taken in the economic literature on minimum contributing sets and provision points (e.g., Van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes 1983; Rapoport 1985; Bagnoli and Lipman 1989; Bagnoli and McKee 1991) . Following the literature on international environmental agreements (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994) , we chose to model participation as a separate decision using the concept of a self-enforcing equilibrium.
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The justification for modeling the participation decision separately is both empirical and theoretical. First, on the empirical side, 15 Although we do not specify a form for P(Y), we assume throughout that its curvature, coupled with the curvature of the cost function given above, ensure that all second-order conditions are satisfied. 16 These are derived from the standard first order conditions, i.e., P9 (Y )y i + P(Y ) 2 C y (y i ,e i ) 5 0 for all i, which are sufficient given the assumption in footnote 15. Note that if the firm's cost function is strongly separable, i.e., if C ye 5 0, then the optimal output choice will not depend on the emissions level.
17 Using the envelope theorem, the first order conditions defining the optimal emissions levels become
18 The difference between the two approaches can be illustrated using the example in Section 2. Note that in this example, although (P,P) is not a Nash equilibrium in participation, (e 1 ,e 2 )5(5,5) is a Nash equilibrium in the emission choices. The reason is that, under the selfenforcing equilibrium, if one firm chooses to ''defect'' and hence not participate, it is assumed that the other participating firm will reduce its emissions to ensure the target is still met, provided it is profitable for it to do so. In contrast, under the Nash equilibrium in emission choices, when one firm considers reducing its emissions below 5, it assumes that the other firm will continue to emit 5 units. Note that the self-enforcing equilibria that we identify would also be equilibria if we modeled emissions decisions as a Nash equilibrium. However, some of the equilibria under this latter approach would not be self-enforcing. Hence, our approach uses what is in a way a narrower class of equilibria (i.e., imposes a stronger condition), than the Nash equilibrium in emissions and one which we feel (for reasons given below) is more empirically relevant in our context. Had we modeled Nash equilibria in emission decisions, the only result that would change is that we would not be able to rule out an equilibrium under which all firms participate and the first-best is achieved under the VA. However, since we are primarily interested in whether VAs that do not involve full participation can still be effective, our major conclusion (namely, that a VA can be successful despite the existence of free-riding) would not be changed. For a related application to nonpoint pollution using the Nash equilibrium approach, see Segerson and Wu (2006 19 Similarly, in the context of environmental protection, the seminal papers by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) both use this approach to predict the likely outcomes under international environmental agreements. Our model is effectively an application of their approach to voluntary agreements among firms rather than among countries. Thus, for both empirical and theoretical reasons, we believe that modeling the participation decision separately in the first stage is reasonable and appropriate in our context.
The outcome of the first stage participation decisions determines the next stage. If no firms choose to participate in Stage 1, the VA fails and the firms play the tax game described in the previous section. 20 If some firms choose to participate, the game proceeds to Stage 2. In Stage 2, each non-participant chooses its emissions level to maximize profits, given the emissions levels of all other non-participating firms and the commitment of participating firms. In Stage 3, all firms engage in Cournot competition in the output market. We model the Stage 2 and Stage 3 decisions as Nash equilibria.
21 For simplicity, we consider only symmetric equilibria in Stages 2 and 3, that is, equilibria in which all participating firms choose the same emissions and output levels 22 and all non-participating firms do as well. In contrast, as noted above, because Stage 1 decisions involve commitment to join a group or coalition, we model the Stage 1 equilibrium using the concept of a self-enforcing equilibrium.
Let N p denote the number of firms that choose to participate in Stage 1, and let N n 5 N 2 N p be the number of nonparticipating firms. We solve the game through backward induction and hence consider the Stage 3 equilibrium first. Let e p denote the (common) emissions level of a participating firm, and let e n denote the corresponding level for a non-participating firm. In Stage 3, both types of firms choose their output levels to maximize their own profits, given these emissions levels. More specifically, participating firms choose the output level y p that maximizes
while non-participating firms choose the output level y n that maximizes
19 Dixit and Olson (2000) use the concept of subgame perfection rather than the concept of a self-enforcing equilibrium to model the participation decision since participation does not imply a collective commitment. 20 For simplicity, we assume that the failure of the VA is detected and the tax is imposed instantaneously. In a two-period model in which detection occurs in the first period and the tax is imposed in the second period, the total payoffs would depend on the discount rate. See Millock and Salanié (2000) and Segerson and Wu (2006) for multi-period models of VAs. 21 Since the group of participants collectively agrees to ensure that the target is met, it might seem more appropriate to assume that they cooperate in their choice of output levels as well. However, in many countries such cooperation in the output market would be illegal under anti-trust laws. For this reason, we assume that all firms, including all participating firms, act non-cooperatively when choosing output. 22 With identical firms, this is the most efficient allocation of emissions across the set of participating firms. It is also the allocation that would result from joint profit maximization or Nash bargaining by participating firms. 23 Bars over variables indicate that the firm takes these variables as given. 
respectively, where
Given the optimal output choices and resulting profits levels from Stage 3, we now consider the equilibrium in Stage 2. A Stage 2 equilibrium is defined by two conditions. The first is that each non-participating firm chooses its emissions level to maximize its profits in [4] , given the emissions levels of all other firms. 24 The second condition requires that the emissions level for each participating firm be the level that ensures that the target is met, given the emissions levels of the non-participating firms, that is, Note that an increase in N p can affect the profits of both participating and nonparticipating firms in two ways: (1) through the impact on emissions (a direct effect), and (2) through the impact on output choices (an indirect effect). To see the direct effect, first note that if the cost function is strongly separable, that is, if C ye 5 0, then the Stage 3 equilibrium, that is, the optimal output choice, is independent of the emissions levels. This implies that both participating and non-participating firms will choose the same output levels, which in turn implies that both those output levels and the corresponding price will be independent of the number of participating firms. Thus, the effect of N p on profits is just the direct effect that occurs through the choice of emissions level. For non-participating firms, the emissions level that would be chosen under separability is determined by the first-order condition
which is independent of N p . Thus, under separability, Lp
, that is, the direct effect is zero. For participating firms, the level of emissions is determined by [5] . This implies that
Thus, as expected, an increase in the number of participating firms directly increases the profits of each participating firm, since the emissions reduction that each participant must undertake to ensure the target is met is reduced when the number of participants increases. When the cost function is not strongly separable, a second, indirect effect exists as well. In this case, the firms' optimal output choices depend on emissions levels since emissions levels affect marginal production costs. Hence, output choices will be different for participating and non-participating firms, implying that the total output (and hence price) in the market will depend on the number of participating firms. This price effect then further affects equilibrium output levels and thus profits. While these indirect effects through the output market can exist, the existing empirical evidence suggests that even for heavily polluting industries emission abatement costs constitute a relatively small share of production costs (see, e.g., Jaffe et al. 1995) . For this reason, we assume throughout the remainder of the paper that these effects are ''small,'' and hence that the total effects of a change in the number of participating firms are dominated by the direct effects described above. Thus, in what follows we assume that an increase in the number of participating firms increases profits for participating firms but has no significant effect on the profits of non-participants. Note that this implies that p
This simply says that when the target is met at any participation rate less than full participation, non-participants earn a higher profit than participants.
We are now in a position to identify the Stage 1 equilibria that are self-enforcing, that is, both profitable and stable (both externally and internally) in the sense defined in the literature on international environmental agreements and stable cartels (d 'Aspremont et al. 1983; d'Aspremont and Gabszewicz 1986; Donsimoni, Economides, and Polemarchakis 1986; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994) . The need for self-enforcement stems from the fact that participation in the voluntary approach is not binding. Hence, in equilibrium the participation decisions of all firms and the resulting number of participating firms should be such that continued participation in the group is in the selfinterest of participating firms, and no nonparticipants want to join. This requires that the equilibrium be both profitable and internally and externally stable.
An
, that is, if at this equilibrium the participating firms are at least as well off under the voluntary program as they would have been without the program (and hence with the tax).
25 Furthermore, an equilibrium is both internally and externally stable if (1) no participating firm has an incentive to defect unilaterally, that is, to become a nonparticipating firm; and (2) no non-participating firm has an incentive to join unilaterally, that is, to become a participating firm.
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To identify equilibria that are stable, we must define more explicitly the payoffs from participation (and hence from accession and defection) at various levels of participation. To do this, we first define N Ã p to be the minimum number of participating firms necessary to make the voluntary approach profitable for the participating firms.
27 Thus, if p
If joining the voluntary program entails a fixed cost F, then the condition for profitability would become p
This would increase the minimum participation level defined below, but, with the appropriate changes in the subsequent definitions, would not otherwise change the qualitative results. 26 As in the stable cartel literature, we do not consider the possibility of transfers between participating and nonparticipating firms. Some IEA studies allow this kind of transfer (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Botteon and Carraro 1997) . However, transfers seem unlikely in our context. 27 N Ã p is similar to the notion of the ''minimal contributing set (MCS)'', which has been advocated as a solution to the public goods problem (e.g., van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes 1983; Rapoport 1985) . However, the MCS mechanism is typically defined as the minimum number of individuals who must contribute a given amount to reach a pre-specified target that ensures provision of the public good. Since the target and the size of an individual's possible contribution are both fixed, the MCS is exogenously specified. In contrast, in our context an individual firm's ''contribution'' can vary (allowing for the possibility that it will exceed the firstbest level), which implies that the number of firms that must contribute to ensure that the target is met is endogenously determined. level of N p such that
This is illustrated graphically in Figure 3 . 
This, coupled with the continuity and monotonicity of p
, ensures the existence of a unique value of 1 , n # N, at which p
is then simply the largest integer greater than or equal to n. QED To determine which of the profitable equilibria are stable, we note that a level of participation that is not profitable will lead to a dissolution of the coalition and hence the imposition of the tax. Conversely, a level of participation that is profitable will yield the payoffs described above, which were conditional on the collective target being met voluntarily, that is, on the coalition being profitable. Thus, the unconditional payoffs for participants and nonparticipants are given by
( Note that at N p 5 N, p p (N p ) is equal to the profit level that would be realized if all firms participated and hence shared equally in the allowable emissions, p(E/N). This profit level exceeds p Ã t by the amount of the tax payment, t Ã E/N. The two profit functions defined above are depicted in Figure 4 . They can now be used to define external and internal stability of an equilibrium. (1) p p (N p ) $ p n (N p 2 1) (no firm has an incentive to defect), and (2) p n (N p ) $ p p (N p + 1) (no firm has an incentive to accede).
Using the definition of stability and the above profit functions, we can establish the following. hence cannot be a selfenforcing equilibrium). However, for any integer Proposition 2 implies that the only selfenforcing equilibrium is the equilibrium with the minimum amount of profitable participation. Thus, as long as N Ã p v N, a full participation equilibrium will not be self-enforcing. Some amount of free-riding is expected to occur under a successful voluntary approach because of the tax savings generated by the voluntary program. 28 Note that because of the cost savings that result from avoiding an emissions tax, participating firms are willing to reduce their emissions to a level below what they would have chosen under the tax (E/ N).
At the self-enforcing equilibrium the profit level is higher for non-participating firms than for participating firms. Thus, if a
FIGURE 4 UNCONDITIONAL PROFIT FUNCTION OF PARTICIPATING AND NON-PARTICIPATING FIRMS
28 A full participation equilibrium would only be selfenforcing if the tax savings from meeting the target voluntarily were sufficiently small that free-riding by even one firm would make the voluntary approach unprofitable. This is more likely to occur when the number of firms in the industry is small. participating firm could exchange places with a non-participating firm, that is, become a non-participant without affecting the number of participating firms, it would always have an incentive to do so. However, the conditions for stability ensure that in a self-enforcing equilibrium, a participating firm has no incentive to defect unilaterally, despite the fact that it realizes lower profits than the non-participating firms. The reason, of course, is that at the self-enforcing equilibrium the coalition would fall apart if one firm unilaterally defected (since it would no longer be profitable), which would trigger imposition of the tax and thereby yield a profit level for the would-be defector that was no higher than it would have realized if it had continued to participate in the voluntary approach.
We turn next to a key result that establishes the viability of the voluntary approach.
PROPOSITION 3. A self-enforcing equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily always exists.
PROOF. This follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. QED The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. It is clear that a coalition with full participation is always profitable since each firm incurs the same abatement cost as it would have incurred under the tax but avoids the tax payment. If defection by a single firm would yield a coalition size that is not profitable, then the full coalition is self-enforcing. If a coalition of size N 2 1 is still profitable, then the full coalition is not stable, but the coalition of size N 2 1 is a possible self-enforcing equilibrium (if it is stable). By iteratively moving backward starting from the full coalition, we can identify the coalition size where any further defections would yield a remaining coalition that is not profitable. This coalition is then stable and profitable, and hence selfenforcing. If the coalition of one (i.e., N p 5 1) is not profitable, then this iterative process will stop at a coalition size greater than, or equal to two, under which the target would be met voluntarily. Conversely, if the coalition of one is profitable, this iterative process will stop at the coalition of one, since under this condition this coalition is also stable (i.e., the single participant cannot do better by defecting). Thus, in either case, the iterative process will stop at a coalition of strictly positive size, implying the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily. Note that this implies that, even if a voluntary program is not feasible for a low N p , 29 a value of N p $ 1 always exists at which the target can be met voluntarily, and in a manner that is profitable in the sense defined above.
While the minimum participation equilibrium is the only self-enforcing equilibrium under which the target is met, it is also possible to have a self-enforcing equilibrium under which the target is not met. PROOF. Since no firms participate, profitability holds trivially. In addition, if p
, which implies that no firm has an incentive to accede to form a coalition of one. Conversely, if p
, which implies that N p 5 0 is not stable and hence not self-enforcing. QED Note, however, that even if the zero participation outcome is self-enforcing, a self-enforcing equilibrium with positive participation (N Ã p ) also exists (by Proposition 3). In addition, each firm in the industry is at least as well off and some are strictly better off at the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily than at the equilibrium under which it is not. In this sense, the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily Pareto dominates. Thus, even when multiple selfenforcing equilibria exist, we might expect 29 This occurs when N p , N 2 (E/e n ), so that e p , 0. 30 Note that the payoffs in Figure 2 satisfy this condition while the payoffs in Figure 1 do not.
84(1)
Dawson and Segerson: Voluntary Pollution Agreements with Industriesfirms to choose the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily.
V. POLICY COMPARISONS
The results in the previous section imply that, unless N Ã p~N , some amount of freeriding will result under a successful voluntary approach, because of the tax savings that can be realized if the emissions cap is met voluntarily. Note, however, that because the cap is met under either the tax policy or the voluntary program, free-riding does not lead to under-provision of the public good (environmental quality). It does, however, affect both the total private and social costs of supplying that level of the public good.
PROPOSITION 5. Aggregate profit for the industry is higher when the target is met voluntarily than under the emissions tax.
PROOF. The industry-wide aggregate profits under the tax policy are given by
Aggregate profits when the target is met voluntarily are
Thus,
where the inequality follows from p
Thus, as expected, aggregate profits are higher when the target is met voluntarily than when it is met through imposition of the tax, since at a self-enforcing equilibrium all firms are at least as well off under the voluntary program as they are under the tax. Interestingly, however, in equilibrium the aggregate profit gain that results from the use of the voluntary program is not the aggregate tax savings (t Ã E). The profit differential for the non-participants exceeds the magnitude of their tax savings (which is t Ã E/N per firm). It reflects the gain both from not having to pay any tax on emissions and from not having to undertake any abatement under the voluntary approach. In contrast, when N Ã p v N, the profit gain to participants is less than the magnitude of their tax savings, since they undertake more abatement under the voluntary program than they would have undertaken under the tax.
31
Given the result in Proposition 5, we would expect the industry as a whole to prefer the voluntary program, since all firms are individually at least as well off and collectively better off than under the tax. However, as stated below, use of the voluntary approach will actually lead to higher social costs than would have resulted under the tax policy. This follows directly from the fact that, when firms are identical and the profit function is strictly concave, 32 the total cost of meeting the cap is minimized when emissions are distributed equally across all firms (Baumol and Oates 1988) . This occurs under the tax policy (all firms emit e Ã t t Ã ð Þ), but not under the voluntary approach (since in equilibrium participants emit less than non-participants). Thus, despite the fact that no firm is any worse off under the voluntary program and each participating firm has full flexibility to meet its own emission level in a cost-minimizing way, using a voluntary program rather than a tax to meet the aggregate emissions cap generates a social cost because of the unequal 31 When N Ã p~N , the profit differential for all firms is simply their tax savings, since all firms undertake the same amount of abatement under the voluntary approach as under the tax. 32 With a linear profit function, aggregate profits are independent of the allocation of abatement across firms.
(and hence inefficient) distribution of abatement across firms.
33
The increased social costs associated with the voluntary approach stem from the threatened imposition of an emissions tax, which is costly to firms. If the regulator could credibly threaten imposition of a firstbest regulation, 34 under which each firm would realize a profit of p(E/N), the results would be different. In this case, the only self-enforcing equilibrium under which the target is met is the full-participation equilibrium. With full participation, the allocation of abatement is efficient across all firms and thus total social costs are the same under the regulation as under the voluntary approach. However, under a first-best regulation the industry does not realize a gain from the voluntary approach. 35 Hence, neither the industry nor the regulator has a reason to want to use the voluntary approach.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Policymakers are increasingly interested in the use of voluntary approaches to environmental protection as an alternative to more traditional regulatory approaches. In many cases, entire industries are faced with possible imposition of costly environmental policies if environmental goals are not met voluntarily. If the threat is industrywide, a potential free-rider problem exists since, if the environmental goal is met by others, individual firms would benefit from avoidance of the costly policy without incurring the associated cost.
In this paper, we developed a multiplefirm model in which an industry is faced with an aggregate emissions limit and given an opportunity to meet the target voluntarily, with the explicit recognition that failure to do so would result in imposition of an industry-wide emissions tax. Faced with this prospect, we ask whether a voluntary approach can be successful, given the incentive for individual firms to free ride. We show that a self-enforcing equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily always exists, and occurs at the minimum profitable participation level. Thus, the only self-enforcing equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily will involve free-riding (unless free-riding by just one firm makes the coalition unprofitable). The zero participation outcome (under which the target is not met voluntarily) can also be a self-enforcing equilibrium. However, it is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily. Thus, even though free-riding is a likely outcome in equilibrium (i.e., a self-enforcing equilibrium will not generally involve full participation), the free-rider incentive does not destroy the viability of successfully using an industry-wide voluntary approach.
As expected, free-riding generates an efficiency loss. However, this loss does not take the usual form of under-provision of the public good. Rather, it takes the form of an increase in the cost of providing the targeted level of the public good. An emissions tax ensures that the aggregate 33 Proposition 6 identifies a distortion that results when the target is met voluntarily by a subset of firms in the industry. With imperfect competition in the output market, a second distortion exists as well. A full welfare comparison between the two policy approaches requires consideration of not only the different aggregate abatement costs but also the different aggregate output levels under the tax and voluntary approach. Under separability (C ye 5 0), aggregate output is the same under the two policies. However, without separability the two can be different. If the voluntary approach leads to less output because of higher cost, this would exacerbate the efficiency loss that stems directly from the inefficient allocation of abatement across firms.
34 By first-best, we mean a regulation that provides the flexibility for each firm to achieve its emission reductions in the least cost way (such as a performance standard) and ensures an efficient allocation across firms. It is well-known, however, that regulation does not provide efficient long-run entry/exit incentives. See, e.g., Baumol and Oates (1988) . 35 In contrast, if the regulator threatens imposition of an inefficient regulation, both society and the industry can benefit from use of the voluntary approach. Segerson and Dawson (2001) show that under the threat of the imposition of a regulation that is not fully efficient (e.g., one that does not allow the firm full flexibility in determining how the standard will be met), the total social cost of meeting an exogenous environmental quality standard will always be lower under the voluntary approach than under the regulation, even though in equilibrium only partial participation will occur. emissions target is met at least cost. With identical firms, this results when emissions reductions are allocated uniformly across firms. Under the voluntary approach, the allocation of emissions reductions is no longer uniform, since participating firms reduce emissions by more than non-participants. This unequal distribution of abatement across firms results in a higher overall cost of meeting the aggregate emission reduction goal. Thus, despite the fact that firms have full flexibility to meet their emissions reductions in the least cost way, total social costs are higher under the voluntary approach.
Although the voluntary approach results in higher social costs, it generates a gain for both participating and non-participating firms, and hence for the industry as a whole. This gain stems from the avoided tax payments. However, the magnitude of that gain is not given by the amount of the avoided tax payments. Non-participants gain more than their avoided tax payments, while participants gain less. Nonetheless, all firms are at least as well off and some are always strictly better off than under the tax alternative, which suggests that the industry would prefer the voluntary approach. 36 Would a regulator ever prefer the voluntary approach? Within the context of the model developed here, a welfare-maximizing regulator would never prefer the voluntary approach to the tax, because of the increase in the social cost of meeting the target. 37 However, the model abstracts from a number of potential benefits from using a voluntary approach (such as increased cooperation and reduced political resistancesee, e.g., CEC 1996) as well as potential imperfections in the design of an emissions tax (such as an inability to tax all emissions-see, e.g., . Consideration of these potential benefits of the voluntary approach would have to be weighed against the cost generated by freeriding in assessing the overall welfare implications of an industry-wide voluntary approach.
Finally, although our focus has been on industry-based voluntary agreements in a context where the regulator can penalize an entire industry but cannot target individual firms (e.g., non-participants), the general principles we have derived here could have implications for other contexts with a similar structure. For example, in an international context, it may be possible for an international body to impose sanctions that affect the economy as a whole even if it cannot directly sanction individual firms that fail to contribute to a given goal. Our results would suggest that the threat of sanctions might be effective in inducing compliance with the goal, but in a way that is not necessarily cost-effective.
